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The International Criminal Court (ICC) – A Postcolonial Tool for Western States 
to Control Africa? 
Lea Ina Schneider, BLaw1 
Abstract 
This paper examines the question to what extent the criticism is justified that the ICC 
functions as a postcolonial tool for Western countries to control African countries. To analyse 
this question, this paper focuses on two main arguments of the postcolonial critique: first, the 
accusation that the ICC focuses unfairly on Africa and second, that the ICC is as a hegemonic 
tool of the West which stresses the importance of global politics in the practice of the ICC.  
Evaluating the two key aspects of the postcolonial critique, I conclude that the ICC is unfairly 
accused of practising selective prosecution and also the critique that the ICC is a hegemonic 
tool of Western countries is not true as African countries played an essential role in its 
formation. However, the critique of the role of the UNSC is justified.  
Key Words: International Criminal Court (ICC), Postcolonial Critique of the ICC, Western 
States, Anti-African Bias, ICC as a Hegemonic Tool of the West 
I. Introduction 
The International Criminal Court (ICC), the only universal and permanent judicial body 
with jurisdiction over international crimes,2 was only founded in 2002. An initial euphoria on 
what the ICC could achieve was quickly replaced by a lot of criticism.3 Especially, the ICC 
experiences increased resistance from African states who criticize that their nationals are the 
ones mostly convicted by the ICC. Additionally, they argue that politics plays the main role in 
the decision to investigate and prosecute specific individuals within the jurisdiction of the 
ICC.4 As a result of these criticisms, the African Union (AU) has even contemplated a mass 
withdrawal from the ICC by African states parties to the Rome Statute (RS), thereby 
threatening the existence of the ICC.5 
The criticism that the ICC reflects postcolonial structures will be referred to as the 
‘postcolonial critique’ throughout this paper. This critique argues that postcolonial power 
structures are maintained by the ICC, mostly in two ways: first, by practising selective 
prosecution and second, by being a hegemonic tool of the West which focuses on the 
relationship between the ICC and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and claims 
that Western politics influences the ICC strongly. This paper will focus on these two aspects 
of the postcolonial critique.  
There is much literature about the postcolonial critique in general, however, this paper 
takes a different angle by focusing on the relationship between the AU, the UNSC and the 
 
1  After September 2020: LL.M King’s College London in Transnational Law and MLaw University of Zurich 
and PhD Candidate, University of Zurich.  
2  Mandiaye Niang, Africa and the Legitimacy of the ICC in Question, in Nicholson Joanna (ed.), 
Strengthening the Validity of International Criminal Tribunals (2018), 303–312, 303.  
3  See for example Max du Plessis, The International Court that Africa wants, Institute for Security Studies 
(August 2010), <https://media.africaportal.org/documents/Mono172.pdf> (accessed 11 May 2020); Charles 
Chernor Jalloh, Africa and the International Criminal Court: Collision Course or Cooperation, 34(2) North 
Carolina Central Law Review 203 (2012); André Mbata Mangu, The International Criminal Court, Justice, 
Peace and the Fight against Impunity in Africa: An Overview, 40(2) Africa Development 7 (2015); Tim 
Murithi, Between Political Justice and Judicial Politics: Charting a Way Forward for the African Union and 
the International Criminal Court, in Werle Gerhard/Fernandez Lovell/Vormbaum Moritz (eds.), Africa and 
the International Criminal Court (2014), 179–193; Dire Tladi, The African Union and the International 
Criminal Court: The battle for the soul of international law, 34(1) South African Yearbook of International 
Law 57 (2009).  
4  Benson Chinedu Olugbuo, The African Union, the United Nations Security Council and the Politicisation of 
International Justice in Africa, 7(3) African Journal of Legal Studies 351 (2014), 351. 
5  Jacey Fortin, The Continent versus the Court: African Union Deliberates Withdrawal from the ICC, 
International Business Times (11 October 2013), <www.ibtimes.com/continent-versus-court-african-union-
deliberates-withdrawal-icc-1422434> (accessed 11 April 2020).   
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ICC. Focusing on the interaction between these institutions, makes it possible to examine the 
role of politics regarding the ICC which is criticized by the postcolonial critique.  
Western states and the ICC often respond with annoyance to this postcolonial critique 
and try to refute it while stressing the importance of the ICC as a court for justice. This is 
partly understandable as the criticism by African states cannot always be separated from the 
self-interest of their leaders. However, it is an oversimplification if the critique of African 
states is portrayed as a mere misunderstanding or propaganda for criminal leaders.6 
This paper is placed against this highly controversial background and aims to delve 
deeper into the roots of this postcolonial critique. It poses the following research question:  
To what extent is the criticism justified that the ICC functions as a postcolonial 
tool for Western states to control Africa? 
Africa as a continent is highly diversified. It cannot be assumed that there is a 
unanimous ‘African voice’ when it comes to the critique of the ICC.7 While some African 
leaders criticise the work of the ICC, others support it by for example changing their domestic 
legislation to comply with the RS.8 Additionally, many African citizens and Civil Society 
Organisations do not support their governments in their refusal to cooperate with the ICC and 
withdrawal from the RS.9 To do justice to this highly diverse continent, I will refer as often as 
possible to the specific country. Yet my aim remains to provide a synopsis over the two 
aspects of the postcolonial critique outlined before.  
This paper argues that the postcolonial critique needs to be taken seriously, 
independently of whether one agrees with it or not, it poses a serious legitimacy threat to the 
ICC. Legitimacy is a complex, multidimensional concept.10 I use the term herein to refer to 
the perception among relevant audiences that the ICC's actions are worthy of respect.11 Such 
legitimacy depends to a significant degree on whether such audiences perceive the Court –
primarily the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) – as selecting appropriate crimes and defendants 
for prosecution.12  
I claim that the postcolonial critique is a chance to identify some of the main 
weaknesses of the ICC and improve them. Indeed, while the first aspect of the critique, 
namely that the ICC is practising selective prosecution is not justified, the second aspect 
which claims that the ICC is a hegemonic tool of the West, is justified regarding the 
problematic role of the UNSC. Overall, this paper concludes that the question of whether the 
postcolonial critique is true is less vital than the question of how to react to these criticisms.  
First, this paper will outline and contextualize the postcolonial critique, focusing on the 
two aspects mentioned before in order to evaluate them critically afterwards. The aim is to 
examine where the postcolonial critique usefully draws attention to and where it is not 
justified.  
 
6  Marieke de Hoon, The Future of the International Criminal Court, On Critique, Legalism and Strengthening 
the ICC’s Legitimacy, 17(4) International Criminal Law Review 591 (2017), 594.  
7  Mangu, supra note 3, at 10; Sarah Nimigan, The Malabo Protocol, the ICC, and the Idea of ‘Regional 
Complementarity’, 17(5) Journal of International Criminal Justice 1005 (2019), 1012; Hermanus Jacobus 
Van der Merwe, The International Criminal Court, Universal Jurisdiction and Africa: Intrusion or 
Intercession?, in Hermanus Jacobus/Kemp Gerhard (eds.), International Criminal Justice in Africa, 2017 
(2018), 53–71, 66–67. 
8  Mangu, supra note 3, at 28.  
9  Id, 25; Elise Keppler, Managing Setback for the International Criminal Court in Africa, 56(1) Journal of 
African Law 1 (2012), 8.  
10  Hilary Charlesworth, Conclusion: The Legitimacies of International Law, in Charlesworth Hilary/Coicaud 
Jean-Marc (eds.), Fault Lines of International Legitimacy (2010), 389–398, 396.  
11  Margaret M. De Guzman, choosing to prosecute: Expressive selection at the international criminal court, 
33(2) Michigan Journal of International Law 265 (2012), 268.  
12  Id. 
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Subsequently, I will examine the Sudan-Situation in order to demonstrate the complex 
interaction between the ICC, the AU and the UNSC with the help of a concrete example. In 
the last section, I will outline possible ways of improving the legitimacy of the ICC through 
drawing insights from the postcolonial critique.  
II. Postcolonial Critique 
1. The Initial Euphoria of the ICC Establishment  
When the ICC came to life in 2002, it was universally acclaimed as a historic milestone, 
including by African states and civil society. African states were enthusiastic about 
welcoming the new court as it raised hope for justice.13 Not only individual states but also 
regional organisations including the Organisation of African Unity, the predecessor of the AU 
supported the establishment of the ICC.14 
As a continent marred with mass atrocities, Africa could now contemplate an alternative 
to the prevailing impunity enjoyed thus far by many warlords.15 The founding of the ICC was 
thought to strengthen the rule of law and place moral limits on the tempestuous logic of 
realpolitik.16 The fresh memories of the Rwandan genocide in 1994 strengthened Africa’s 
decision to support the idea of an independent and effective international court that would 
punish and even deter perpetrators of such crimes in the future.17 Hence, some AU member 
states such as Senegal, Niger and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) were 
instrumental in the creation of the RS and the establishment of the ICC.18 In its first strategic 
plan, the AU called on its member states to ratify the RS19 and Africa today constitutes the 
largest geographical group in the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) of the ICC.20  
As outlined, initially, the regional bloc supported the work of the ICC in Africa – why 
has this changed? Discontent with the ICC had been brewing in Africa as early as 2005.21 
Especially, African states disagreed with the ICC on the cases involving Sudanese President 
Omar al-Bashir and Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta.22  
When the efforts of the African leaders to suspend these cases failed,23 they began 
discrediting the ICC’s actions and undermining its legitimacy. They claimed that Africans 
 
13  Jalloh, supra note 3, at 209.  
14  Solomon A. Dersso, The ICC’s Africa Problem, A Spotlight on the Politics and Limits of International 
Criminal Justice, in Clarke Kamari M./Knottnerus Abel S./De Volder Eefje (eds.), Africa and the ICC, 
Perceptions of Justice (2016), 61–77, 62.  
15  Niang, supra note 2, at 303.  
16  Tor Krever, International Criminal Law: An Ideology Critique, 26(3) Leiden Journal of International Law 
701 (2013), 702. 
17  Jalloh, supra note 3, at 205.  
18  Philomena Apiko/Faten Aggad, The International Criminal Court, Africa and the African Union: What way 
forward? 201 European Centre for Development Policy Management (2016), <https://ecdpm.org/wp-
content/uploads/DP201-ICC-Africa-AU-Apiko-Aggad-November-2016.pdf> (accessed 6 April 2020), 1; 
Hassan Jallow/Fatou Bensouda, International criminal law in an African context, in Du Plessis Max (ed.), 
African Guide to International Criminal Justice (2008), 15–53, 41–43. 
19  Mehari Taddele Maru, The International Criminal Court and African leaders: Deterrence and general shift of 
attitude, 247 ISPI Analysis (2014), 
<https://www.ispionline.it/sites/default/files/pubblicazioni/analysis_247_2014.pdf> (accessed 6 April 
2020), 5.  
20  Among the 123 states members of the ICC, 33 are from Africa, <https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states% 
20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx> (accessed 13 April 2020).  
21  Kurt Mills, “Bashir is Dividing Us”: Africa and the International Criminal Court, 34(2) Human Rights 
Quarterly 404 (2012), 406; Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer, The African Union and the International Criminal 
Court; Counteracting the Crisis, 92(6) International Affairs 1319 (2016), 1321. 
22  Ronald Chipaike/Nduduzo Tshuma/Sharon Hofisi, African Move to Withdraw from the ICC: Assessment of 
Issues and Implications, 75(3) India Quarterly 334 (2019), 338.  
23  The UNSC Res. 11176 (15 November 2013), United Nations Meeting Coverage and Press Releases, Security 
Council Resolution Seeking Deferral of Kenyan Leaders’ Trial Fails to Win Adoption, with 7 Voting in 
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were the main targets of the ICC even though mass atrocities were committed elsewhere too, 
but no credible effort were made by the OTP to take action against those perpetrators.24  
However, the opinions of civil society and the government do not always coincide. 
Many Africans record their dissent against the current trend of disparaging the ICC. They 
argue that as long as those who perpetrate heinous crimes in Africa are brought to justice, this 
helps Africa. Also, in many African states, not only were the legal requirements for the ICC to 
claim jurisdiction met, but the ICC was also called upon to intervene by African states.25 
Hence, some are inclined to see the current complaints against the ICC as a drive by a 
syndicate of African leaders only interested in covering their own backs.26 
2. Analysis of the Postcolonial Critique 
Year after year, tensions between African and Western states intensify during the annual 
ASP diplomatic conventions; especially around the ICC’s alleged anti-African bias which 
reflects in the ICC’s current exclusive trial of African nationals27 and the role of global 
politics in the practice of the ICC which is perceived as a system of Western politics. In the 
following, I will examine these two aspects of the postcolonial critique in more detail.  
a) ICC as the ‘African Criminal Court’ 
From its inception in 2002 until now, ten out of thirteen situations under investigation of 
the ICC concerned African states.28 All of the concluded cases of the ICC are African.29 This 
situation explains why Professor Mamdani accuses the ICC of «[…] rapidly turning into a 
Western court to try African crimes against humanity.»30 This postcolonial view on the ICC 
portrays the court as a Western master exercising imperial power over African subjects. The 
ICC represents a tool for Western powers to further demean the already demeaned victims of 
past colonialism, with the help of law which is a mere tool of Western domination.31 
There is thus a general perception in Africa that the OTP practises selective prosecution 
using geopolitical considerations, targeting Africa and casting a blind eye on atrocities 
committed by the United States and its allies in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan.32 The fact that 
 
Favour, 8 Abstaining, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc11176.doc.htm> (accessed 10 May 2020) 
seeking the deferral of the trial of the Kenyan leaders did not marshal enough votes to pass.  
24  Niang, supra note 2, at 305.  
25  Id, 306.  
26  Luke Moffet, Al Bashir’s escape: why the African Union defies the ICC, The Conversation (15 June 2015), 
<https://theconversation.com/al-bashirs-escape-why-the-african-union-defies-the-icc-43226> (accessed 13 
April 2020)  
27  De Hoon, supra note 6, at 593.  
28  ICC, Trying individuals for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and aggression, Situations under 
investigation, <https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/situation.aspx> (accessed 28 June 2020).   
29  Coalition for the International Criminal Court, 
<http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/cases?field_case_status_tid=366> (accessed 1 May 2020).  
30  Mahmood Mamdani, How the ICC's "Responsibility to Protect" is being turned into an assertion of 
neocolonial domination, Pambazuka News (17 September 2008), 
<https://www.pambazuka.org/governance/darfur-icc-and-new-humanitarian-order> (accessed 17 April 2020).   
31  Kamari Maxine Clarke, Affective Justice, The International Criminal Court and the Pan-Africanist Pushback 
(2019), 31; Tladi, supra note 3, at 58. 
32  Chipaike/Tshuma/Hofisi, supra note 22, at 340; Ntombizozuko Dyani, Is the International Criminal Court 
Targeting Africa? Reflections on the Enforcement of International Criminal Law in Africa, in Nmehielle 
Vincent O. (ed.), Africa and the Future of International Criminal Justice (2012), 185–220, 185; Henry J. 
Richardson, African Grievances and the International Criminal Court: Issues of African Equity under 
International Criminal Law, in Nmehielle Vincent O. (ed.), Africa and the Future of International Criminal 
Justice (2012), 81–124, 83; Manisuli Ssenyonjo, The Implementation of the Proprio Motu Authority of the 
Prosecutor in Africa, in Jalloh Charles Chernor/Bantekas Ilias (eds.), The International Criminal Court and 
Africa (2017), 38–63, 62–63; Adedokun Ogunfolu/Usang Maria Assim, Africa and the International Criminal 
Court, 18(1) East African Journal of Peace & Human Rights 101 (2012); Scott Stearns, African Union Says 
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cases drawn from African situations involve only Africans, while non-African actors arguably 
also participate in conflicts and atrocities in the continent further contributes to this 
perception.33 Murithi argues that Africa is being singled out since the ICC cannot risk 
alienating its biggest financial supporters, and Africa lacks the diplomatic and economic 
power of other states.34 This results in only weak individuals from generally poor African 
states being indicted.35 Due to its colonial history, the ICC’s investigations in Africa have 
evoked concerns over states’ sovereignty. Since criminal law is the branch of law most 
associated with sovereignty36 it is even more vulnerable to the postcolonial critique. African 
states feel that, apart from only focusing on Africa, the ICC undermines Africa’s efforts to 
solve its problems and its conflict resolution processes.37 It is, therefore, unsurprising that the 
AU is sceptical of exposing its political leaders to what is perceived as a mainly European 
judicial system.38  
 
b) ICC as Hegemonic Tool of the Western Powers: The UNSC, 
AU and the ICC – A Delicate Collaboration  
The postcolonial critique argues that the OTP bends to the wishes of Western foreign 
policy,39 which is seen as a perpetuation of power imbalances stemming from colonial times. 
Central to the accusation of pursuing Western politics and thereby being a hegemonic tool of 
the West, is the role of the UNSC and the interest of its P5 members.40 The central role of the 
UNSC in the tension between the AU and the ICC is evident particularly concerning the ICC 
situations in Darfur and Libya.41  
As per Articles 1216 of the RS, the ICC may initiate an investigation by the referral of a 
state party, on the OTP’s own initiative (proprio motu), or by referral from the UNSC. 
Mainly, it is the referral and deferral powers of the UNSC which evoke criticism.42 The 
UNSC referral power enables the ICC to exercise jurisdiction when a state is not a party to the 
RS or defer cases for subsequent years, even though the majority of the P5 of the UNSC, 
namely the United States, China and Russia are not member states of the ICC.43 Despite the 
ICC’s universal jurisdiction, it requires a referral from the UNSC to investigate in a non-party 
 
ICC Prosecutions Are Discriminatory, Voice of America (4 July 2011), <www.voanews.com/africa/african-
union-says-icc-prosecutions-are-discriminatory> (accessed 11 April 2020).  
33  Ifeonu Eberechi, Armed Conflicts in Africa and Western Complicity: A Disincentive African Union’s 
Cooperation with the ICC, 3(1) African Journal of Legal Studies 53 (2009) 56–71, 75–76.  
34  Tim Murithi, Africa’s relations with the ICC: A need for reorientation?, in Heinrich Böll Stiftung, A 
Fractious relationship: Africa and the International Criminal Court (2012), 
<https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/2012-08-Perspectives_Africa_1_12.pdf> (accessed 18 April 2020), 
4–9, 5.  
35  David Kezio-Musoke, Kagame Tells Why He is Against ICC Charging Bashir, Daily Nation (5 August 
2008), <https://www.nation.co.ke/news/africa/1066-446426-7ulr1ez/index.html> (accessed 16 April 2020).   
36  Elies Van Sliedregt, International Criminal Law: Over-studied and Underachieving?, 29(1) Leiden Journal of 
International Law 1 (2016), 6; see Robert Cryer, International Criminal Law vs State Sovereignty: Another 
Round?, 16(5) European Journal of International Law 979 (2006) for an analysis of criminal law and state 
sovereignty.  
37  Du Plessis, supra note 3, at 13 ff; see Kamari Maxine Clarke, Fictions of Justice, The International Criminal 
Court and the Challenge of Legal Pluralism in Sub-Saharan Africa (2009) for a critical stance on the ICC’s 
role in Africa.  
38  Tladi, supra note 3, at 66.  
39  Alexis Arieff/Rhoda Margesson/Marjorie Ann Browne/Matthew C. Weed, International Criminal Court 
Cases in Africa: Status and Policy Issues, 7-5700 Congressional Research Service (2011), 
<https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34665.pdf> (accessed 6 April 2020), 27.  
40  Kenneth Anderson, The Rise of International Criminal Law: Intended and Unintended Consequences, 20(2) 
European Journal of International Law 331 (2009), 334. 
41  Dire Tladi, When Elephants Collide it is the Grass that Suffers: Cooperation and the Security Council in the 
Context of the AU/ICC Dynamic, 7(3) African Journal of Legal Studies 381 (2014), 382.  
42  Clarke, supra note 31, at 2.  
43  Mangu, supra note 3, at 11; Maru, supra note 19, at 3. 
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state.44 Examples for situations where a UNSC referral would be needed are Myanmar, Syria, 
Iraq or North Korea.45  
A referral regulated in Article 13(b) of the RS and a deferral of ICC jurisdiction which 
is regulated in Article 16 of the RS require the approval of nine of the fifteen UNSC members 
and no veto by the P5 members.46 The travaux préparatoires of Article 16 indicate that the 
relationship between the ICC and the UNSC has been very contentious.47 The content of the 
current Article 16 of the RS was introduced as a means of ensuring that politically motivated 
referrals by states or by the OTP that might contradict UNSC aims could be suspended or 
terminated indefinitely by the UNSC acting under its Chapter VII authority.48 
The underlying logic of the institutional role of the UNSC is that while the OTP focuses 
on investigating and prosecuting international crimes, it is the responsibility of the UNSC as a 
political body to determine when an investigation and prosecution will not serve the interests 
of justice under Article 16.49 This means that if a decision on deferral is to be made, the 
proper channel is through the UNSC which is a political body. However, its political nature 
and composition has resulted in its actions and decisions coming under scrutiny and 
criticisms.50 Clarke/Koulen underline the problematic role of the executive in judicial 
decision-making, when it comes to the referral by the UNSC.51 
Through the referral and deferral powers of the UNSC, the general problem of its 
undemocratic nature regarding the veto powers of the UNSC permanent members is extended 
to the ICC. This is especially problematic as the ICC is placed under the influence of the 
dominant global powers through this key role of the UNSC.52 This leads to the accusation that 
the ICC is manipulated by the political interest of powerful nations and the P5 in the UNSC 
which use their powers and influences to target other nations or characters that endanger their 
respective interests.53 This danger could be reduced by limiting the deferral of proceedings to 
UNSC referrals, ensuring that the ICC does not become involved with politically charged 
situations occasioned by the democracy deficit of the UNSC.54  
Surely, the referral and deferral powers of the UNSC lead to a politization of the ICC as 
the undemocratic nature of veto power dictates justice at the ICC by selecting who and when 
 
44  See Art. 13(b) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, (last amended 2010, 
entered into force on 1 July 2002), 2187 UNTS 3, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3a84.html> 
(accessed 1 May 2020).  
45  Africa and the International Criminal Court, 22(10) Strategic Comments vi (2016), vi.  
46  Dapo Akande/Max du Plessis/Charles Chernor Jalloh, Position Paper, An African Expert Study on the 
African Union Concerns about Article 16 of the Rome Statute of the ICC, Institute for Security Studies, 
(2010), <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/136703/PositionPaper_ICC_2010.pdf> (accessed 11 May 2020), 21.  
47  Morten Bergsmo/Jelena Pejic/Dan Zhu, Article 16, Deferral or investigation or prosecution, in Triffterer 
Otto/Ambos Kai (eds.), Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, 3rd edn (2016), 
770-780, 770–780.  
48  David Scheffer, Three Realities About the African Situation at the International Criminal Court, ICC Forum 
(November 2016), <https://iccforum.com/withdrawal> (accessed 8 May 2020).   
49  Kenneth A. Rodman, Is Peace in the Interests of Justice? The Case for Broad Prosecutorial Discretion at the 
International Criminal Court, 22(1) Leiden Journal of International Law 99 (2009), 120.  
50  Thomas G. Weiss, The Illusion of UN Security Council Reform, 26(4) Washington Quarterly 147 (2003).   
51  Kamari Maxine Clarke/Sarah-Jane Koulen, The Legal Politics of the Article 16 Decision: The International 
Criminal Court, the UN Security Council and Ontologies of a Contemporary Compromise, 7(3) African 
Journal of Legal Studies 297 (2014), 310.  
52  Maru, supra note 19, at 4.  
53  Chipaike/Tshuma/Hofisi, supra note 22, at 339; Hans-Peter Kaul, The International Criminal Court – Current 
Challenges and Perspectives, Salzburg Law School on International Criminal Law (2011), <https://www.icc-
cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/289b449a-347d-4360-a854-3b7d0a4b9f06/283740/010911 salzburglawschool.pdf> 
(accessed 6 April 2020), 9–10. 
54  Olugbuo, supra note 4, at 378; Benson Olugbuo, Positive Complementarity and the Fight Against Impunity 
in Africa, in Murungu Chacha/Biegon Japhet (eds.), Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa (2011), 249–
275, 275.  
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investigation and prosecution take place.55 This power of the UNSC to refer matters to the 
ICC and defer matters currently before the ICC questions the credibility of the ICC as an 
independent court of law.56 The AU began voicing concerns about the abuse of this referral 
principle in 200857 and urged its members in 2012 to defend themselves against the abuse of 
universal jurisdiction.58 Syria is an example of UNSC inaction. Various resolutions have been 
presented to the UNSC to refer this situation to the ICC but have all been vetoed.59 The 
situation in Libya, on the other hand, was referred to the ICC by the UNSC in February 2011 
and the OTP opened an examination days later.60  
Furthermore, repeated AU requests for a deferral in the Bashir case, and in the Kenyan 
and Libyan cases, have essentially been ignored by the UNSC.61 On the other hand, twice 
before the UNSC had used its deferral powers to immunize peacekeepers from non-states 
parties to the RS from ICC investigation or prosecution as a result of United States’ 
pressure.62 Considering the systematic disadvantage that African nations face in UNSC 
decisions, being legally bound by a UNSC decision to the RS that an African country has not 
even ratified is not seen as acceptable.63 For example, the United States was instrumental in 
the establishment of the ICC and still finds ways to involve itself in the ICC’s operations 
through the UNSC, even though it is not a signatory of the RS.64 Other prominent dissenters 
of the ICC are Syria, Iran, China and Iraq.65 Again, these examples are taken to show a 
decidedly anti-African bias in the UNSC referral and deferral procedures and showing the 
problematic role of the UNSC. 
3. Contextualizing the Postcolonial Critique 
a) Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL)  
The postcolonial critique can be embedded into the more general critique of so-called 
transformative projects (that would, for example, include the Responsibility to Protect) which 
 
55  Maru, supra note 19, at 4. 
56  Nabil Elaraby, The Role of the Security Council and the Independence of the International Criminal Court: 
Some Reflections, in Politi Mauro/Nesi Giuseppe (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, A Challenge to Impunity (2001), 43–48, 43.  
57  Christopher Gevers, International Criminal Law and Individualism: An African Perspective, in Schwöbel 
Christine (ed.), Critical Approaches to International Criminal Law, An Introduction (2014), 221–245, 221, 
229. 
58  AU Assembly, Decision on the Abuse of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, adopted 15–16 July 2012, 
AU Assembly, 19th Ordinary Session, No. 5, Doc. EX.CL/731(XXI), 
<https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/9651-assembly_au_dec_416-449_xix_e _final.pdf> (accessed 28 
April 2020). 
59  Clarke/Koulen, supra note 51, at 298; David P. Forsythe, ‘Political Trials’? The UN Security Council and the 
Development of International Criminal Law, in Schabas William A./McDermott Yvonne/Hayes Niamh 
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are criticised for being drawn narrowly from Western models.66 TWAIL and the wider 
postcolonial critique on public international law are essential background trends to understand 
the postcolonial critique of the ICC.67  
TWAIL scholars focus on the notion of international law as embedded in the social, 
historical and political context and argue that law is a crucial site for the creation of 
ideological ideas and the manifestation of social power.68 These scholars have stressed the 
importance of the founding origins of violence that have been part of the colonial and imperial 
tenets of international law.69 They underline that the ICC can reproduce existing inequalities 
in international law – especially, due to its universal jurisdiction which is, in fact, in its 
application focused on non-Western actors.70 Furthermore, TWAIL argues that the UNSC’s 
referral power of situations happening in states which are not parties to the RS, as it was the 
case with Sudan,71 violates Article 35 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
which precludes the application of treaties to third parties absent their consent, and is arguably 
a norm of customary international law as well.72 
b) Postcolonial Perspectives on Public International Law  
Postcolonial scholars criticize the universality claim of today’s international law which 
moves away from a state-centric model of traditional international law based on the 
preservation of sovereignty to one more concerned with humanity.73 Reference is made to 
Simma’s «third level universality» – an approach that establishes a «[…] public order on a 
global scale, a common legal order for mankind as a whole».74  
The birth of the ICC to try serious international crimes is a direct consequence of this 
appeal to universality.75 The appeal to universality has led to a debate about neo-imperialism 
and the imposition of cultural values. The main argument being that this new vision of 
international law and the values it contains is not universal but rather reflects Western 
ideology and these values are now being pushed on non-Western cultures in the name of 
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universality.76 Postcolonial scholars argue that the idea of universality is based on «Western 
rationalism».77 They question that the West as a particular tradition can claim to speak in the 
name of humanity.78  
III. Facing the Postcolonial Critique 
This section intents to evaluate the two aspects of the postcolonial critique identified 
and outlined in Chapter II.  
1. ICC as the ‘African Criminal Court’ 
The criticism that so far only African nationals have been tried can be countered as 
follows: 
States in Africa are likely to be the frequent users of the ICC because of two main 
factors; namely a relatively higher prevalence of conflicts and serious human rights violations, 
and a general lack of credible legal systems to address them.79 Even where states have shown 
their apparent willingness to prosecute perpetrators by signing the RS, it does not necessarily 
follow that the domestic courts are equipped to prosecute perpetrators of violent atrocities. 
Very few African states have in fact adopted the RS into their domestic law.80 Without such 
domestication, in case of dualist states, perpetrators cannot be prosecuted on a national level, 
leaving the ICC with no option but to institute prosecution, according to the complementarity 
principle.81  
Furthermore, there are procedures and rules that govern case selection as protection 
against potential bias in selecting cases.82 Among these is Article 17(1)(d), which is seen as 
tempering the proprio motu powers of the OTP by introducing a gravity threshold to the 
admissibility requirements.83 More importantly, Articles 15, 53 and 58 of the RS impose Pre-
Trial Chamber judicial oversight of the proprio motu and other prosecutorial powers and 
duties of the OTP. These Articles aim to create objective criteria as to when the OTP can start 
investigations. They help to prevent the accusation of selective prosecution as the OTP’s 
decision to investigate each of its situations has been taken within the constraints laid down 
by the RS.84  
Moreover, the ICC is starting to redeem itself from its notable absence involvement in 
the affairs of Western states with the opening of investigations in Afghanistan and Georgia 
and of preliminary examinations in Iraq, over the past few years. Importantly, the preliminary 
examinations in Iraq allow the OTP to focus on the role of nationals from the UK.85 In the 
investigation in Afghanistan, US citizens will also be investigated with the US being a non-
member state.86 However, this has been made considerably more difficult by the sanctions 
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imposed by the United States on Fatou Bensouda and other ICC workers.87 Nevertheless, this 
potential indictment of nationals from permanent member states of the UNSC offers a good 
stance against the critique of an African-bias.  
Furthermore, the question of selective prosecution must be analysed regarding the 
expressive role of the ICC.88 Expressive theories posit that law, like other forms of 
expression, manifests states of mind, including beliefs, attitudes, and intentions.89 An 
expressivist's normative agenda therefore includes both crafting law to express valued social 
messages and employing law as a mechanism for altering social norms.90 What does the 
ICC’s selective prosecution of Africans mean regarding the expressive role of the ICC? Two 
lines of argumentation can be followed: First, in line with the postcolonial critique, the 
exclusive focus on Africa is interpreted as portraying Africa as the continent where crimes 
happen, while at the same time tolerate wrongdoing’s in the rest of the world. Second, failure 
to prosecute particular situations or cases at the ICC is not viewed as expressing approval of 
crimes committed outside of Africa as the ICC is, due to its limited resources, not expected to 
respond to all serious violations of international criminal law.91 De Guzman argues that by 
adopting an expressive approach to case selection at the ICC, the court could also strengthen 
its legitimacy as this would foster an open dialogue about the value choices animating the 
ICC’s selection decisions rather than speculating about the improper motivations of decision 
makers.92 Against the background of the expressive role of the ICC, I argue that focusing on 
African states plays an important role in the global perception where in the world atrocities 
are committed. This is underlined by the fact that gravity is at the centre of the admissibility 
assessment conducted by the OTP.93 This fosters the image that all grave crimes are 
committed in Africa. De Guzman's considerations are conclusive in themselves, but they have 
no effect on global perception, where the most serious crimes are committed. I argue that 
precisely because of the ICC’s need for selectivity, there is a symbolic dimension to its 
choices which make focussing on Africa even more problematic.  
2. ICC as Hegemonic Tool of the Western Powers 
a) Africa as Part of the ICC 
The characterisation of the ICC as a tool of Western imperialism can be rejected insofar 
as that there was a strong involvement of African governments and civil society organisations 
in the drafting of the RS and the establishment of the ICC. Hence, Africa is (at least primarily) 
not a target but a part of the ICC.94 Furthermore, African states voluntarily signed up to be 
subjected to the jurisdiction of the ICC by signing the RS.95 However, Sur contests the idea of 
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free consent by African states to the RS, by referring to the pressure and excessive influence 
of NGOs.96 
The impressive number of African states parties to the RS and the dominance of self-
referrals by African states among the situations before the ICC must be mentioned.97 Uganda, 
DRC and the Central African Republic are examples of such self-referrals.98 By choosing to 
self-refer under the RS, each of the state parties demonstrated their commitment to utilise the 
statute and the principles in the RS by African and other states.99 Especially in the cases 
where the cases are before the ICC due to self-referrals, one cannot argue that Africa is 
targeted unfairly as they themselves triggered the ICC’s jurisdiction.100  
The referrals demonstrate how African states have attempted to use the ICC for political 
ends. The Ugandan and Congolese governments had selfish interests for inviting the ICC to 
do business in their respective states. These appear to have been to employ the ICC to 
prosecute rebel bands within their own territories.101 Hence, in these cases it is ironic to 
suggest that these African situations are proof of the ICC’s meddling in Africa.102 Clark 
argues that the ICC has further empowered the Congolese and Ugandan governments in the 
sense that the ICC has failed to mitigate the states’ ability to pull the strings of international 
justice. This highlights the ICC’s complacency and lack of expertise in Africa.103  
While I do not agree with the criticism that the ICC is a hegemonic tool of the West, I 
do see the critical role the UNSC plays in it. The central institutional role of the UNSC 
remains an open portal through which the politics of the UNSC threatens the actual and 
perceived independence of the ICC.104 The referral and deferral powers of the UNSC must be 
exercised with extreme caution, especially regarding situations in parts of the world that are 
under-represented in the UNSC. Even though negative votes (especially by non-state parties) 
in the UNSC are, of course, wholly outside the ICC’s influence or control, failure to trigger 
the ICC’s universal jurisdiction in non-African states (for example Syria, a resolution to this 
effect was blocked by Russia and China105) still provide powerful ammunition for the court’s 
detractors.106 However, since the ICC does not participate in the UNSC’s decision-making, it 
is not directly responsible for its practice.107 The role of the UNSC is an institutional problem 
that should be improved, but because of that, questioning the ICC as a whole is a short circuit. 
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Thirty-three out of the fifty-five member states of the AU are parties to the RS. This 
statistic puts a lot of strain on the argument that the values represented by the ICC of 
intolerance against impunity are being imposed on African states by Western states.108 The 
value of intolerance against impunity for serious international crimes represented by the ICC 
is an expression of general characteristics of human beings and thus allows for universality.109 
Furthermore, the values under consideration have been (re)appropriated by African culture 
which is reflected in the number of AU member states having ratified the RS and in the 
(re)appropriation of these values in the AU Constitutive Act.110 The provisions of the AU’s 
Constitutive Act suggest that human rights are to play an important role in the work of the 
Union.111 
b) The ICC – Between Law and Politics 
Finally, the postcolonial critique helps to understand the role of politics regarding the 
ICC by claiming that the ICC is a hegemonic tool of the West due to it being ruled by a 
Western political agenda. This aspect of the postcolonial critique can be traced back to the 
more fundamental problem of a denial of the inherent politics of international justice.  
Throughout the recent era of institutionalisation of international criminal law since the 
early 1990s, international criminal courts and tribunals present their mandate as apolitical, one 
where purely legal considerations matter and where politics is subordinated to law.112 The 
ICC is depicted as apolitical as the RS binds decision-makers at the ICC, and largely prohibits 
those decision-makers from considering political concerns.113 To portray the ICC as decidedly 
apolitical is meant to affirm the credibility and legitimacy of the ICC.114 The denial of the 
inherent politics of ICL comes with its predominantly legalist conceptualisation. According to 
the legalist understanding, the law is something external to politics. Law is understood as a 
neutral set of rules that bounds on acceptable state behaviour, whereas politics lies in the 
realm of the unrestrained free will of states.115 While the ICC embodies what is often seen as 
law,116 the UNSC is characterized as decidedly political, undemocratic and non-transparent in 
nature.117 The AU is a political body as well.118  
The idea that law is disconnected from politics fails to take into account that law is 
based on and is an outcome of political choice. The legal language is a form of politics as the 
structure of law represents what a given community accepts as law.119 Law reflects the 
 
108  Tladi, supra note 3, at 65.  
109  Id, 66.  
110  See Art 4(h) and 4(o) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union adopted by the thirty-sixth Ordinary 
Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, 11 July 2000, (entered into force on 26 May 
2001), 2158 UNTS 3, <https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf> (accessed 19 
April 2020).  
111  Amanda Lloyd/Rachel Murray, Institutions with Responsibility for Human Rights Protection under the 
African Union, 48(2) Journal of African Law 165 (2004), 171.  
112  Sarah Nouwen/Wouter Werner, Doing Justice to the Political: The International Criminal Court in Uganda 
and Sudan, 21(4) European Journal of International Law 941 (2010), 942.  
113  Van der Merwe, supra note 7, at 68.  
114  Clark, supra note 103, at 37–41; Clarke/Koulen, supra note 51, at 302.  
115  De Hoon, supra note 6, at 597; see Judith N. Shklar, Legalism, Law, Morals, and Political Trials, 3rd edn 
(1986)for a detailed critique on legalism.  
116  Sosteness Francis Materu, A Strained Relationship: Reflections on the African Union’s Stand Towards the 
International Criminal Court from the Kenyan Experience, in Werle Gerhard/Fernandez Lovell/Vormbaum 
Moritz (eds.), Africa and the International Criminal Court (2014), 211–228, 226. 
117  Clarke/Koulen, supra note 51, at 301. 
118  Murithi, supra note 3, at 7.  
119  De Hoon, supra note 6, at 610; Wouter Werner, The Use of Law in International Political Sociology, 4(3) 
International Political Sociology 304 (2010), 305; David Kennedy, International Legal Structures (1987); 
Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, The Structure of International Legal Argument (2005); Philip 
SUMMER 2020 Journal of International Criminal Law [Vol. 1] 
 
outcome of a political structure and thus is the product of power which means it can reinforce 
power relations and interests.120 There is no doubt that international justice takes place within 
a political, socio-economic and cultural context.121 Hence, the law always operates closely 
with politics.122  
To a certain extent, any court and any trial are political in the sense that they involve 
questions of social power, legislative choice, prosecutorial discretion, and judicial 
interpretation.123 However, international criminal trials are particularly political as the facts, 
causal relations and contexts are usually highly contentious in the cases that land before these 
judges.124 As the court needs to consider the facts and how they should be interpreted, the 
court will inevitably take some political stance.125 Nevertheless, this happens in accordance 
with the rules of judicial interpretation and other legal procedural guarantees.126 As seen, the 
ICC makes choices about who it prosecutes and for what and these choices are unavoidably 
political which is not the problem in and of itself.127 The subject for concern is the ICC’s lack 
of transparency about its politics.128 Efforts to demarcate law and politics render an analysis 
of the politics of law impossible.129  
IV. Case Study: The Challenges of the Sudan-Situation 
The Sudan-Situation has formed what De Waal described as Africa’s «push-back 
against the ICC»130 because the problematic role of the UNSC became apparent. The second 
aspect of the postcolonial critique, namely that the ICC is hegemonic tool of the West, being 
dominated by Western politics, was mostly articulated in response to the Sudan-Situation. The 
aim is to show why this criticism was formulated, laying the focus in the interaction between 
the ICC, the AU and the UNSC. Furthermore, this case study illustrates this paper’s claim that 
irrespectively of whether the postcolonial critique is true or not it questions the ICC’s 
legitimacy. 
Since the UNSC, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and pursuant to Article 
13(b) of the RS, referred the situation in Darfur (Sudan) to the ICC in March 2005,131 the OTP 
has successfully issued various arrest warrants arising from his investigations.132 The most 
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significant and most controversial133 warrant is that for incumbent Sudanese President Omar 
Hassan al-Bashir.134 The UNSC’s referral is historic as it is the first time that the UNSC 
referred a case to the ICC.135  
Specifically, criticism extends to the imperialistic nature of the warrant and the failed 
action of the UNSC on the AU’s deferral request.  
In response to the ICC arrest warrant, the critique that the ICC functions as a hegemonic 
tool for the West formed. Voices arose which claimed that the ICC is a Western and 
imperialistic initiative; being some form of colonial throwback or the imposition of a 
developed world’s form of justice on an unsuspecting and servile African people.136 This 
critique was supported by the fact that Sudan was not a signatory to the RS and therefore has 
not formally recognized the legitimacy of the ICC.137 Bashir argued that the ICC's case was a 
Western ploy to target Sudan's oil and gas resources.138 The Government of Sudan has been 
very direct about the claim of imperialism. In a statement delivered at an AU Ministers of 
Justice Meeting in 2008, the Sudanese Minister of Justice noted that the indictment against 
Bashir was a clear breach of Sudan’s sovereignty establishing «[…] new tyrant legal 
supremacy under the guise of lofty objectives».139  
The AU observes that while it endorses criminal accountability for gross human rights 
violations, the search for justice should be pursued in a way that complements, rather than 
impedes, efforts to secure a lasting peace in the country.140 It emphasizes that ICC jurisdiction 
is based on complementarity and that a prosecution could lead to greater destabilization in 
Sudan and the region.141  
Another point of criticism was the propriety of a UNSC deferral – as requested by AU 
leaders.142 Following the OTP's application for an arrest warrant for Bashir in July 2008, the 
AU immediately adopted a decision calling on the UNSC to deploy Article 16 of the RS to 
«[…] defer the process initiated by the ICC.»143 However, the UNSC failed to act on the AU’s 
deferral request.144 Reacting to this, African states suggested amendments to the RS.145  
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In 2009, as a reaction to the above-mentioned criticisms on the Bashir warrant, the AU 
made the controversial decision suspending cooperation with the ICC in respect of the arrest 
and surrender of Bashir. All AU member states were instructed not to enforce the warrant. 
This means African states might be put in a position where they might have conflicting 
obligations between two different organisations: on the one part, the ICC, which seeks that 
they enforce the Bashir warrant, and on the other, the AU which urges them not to enforce 
it.146 
The AU request not to cooperate with the ICC was not followed unanimously by its 
member states.147 Officially, the AU explained its objection to the execution of the arrest 
warrant against Bashir with their fear that such action would threaten the peace process 
underway in Sudan. However, an underlying reason is the notion that the ICC, as a Western 
institution, should not exercise jurisdiction over African leaders with the arrest warrant 
smacking of imperialist arrogance.148 In the AU Summit Decision, there are hints of the 
attitude that African leaders ought not to be tried under non-African systems.149 
Analysing the Sudan-Situation shows that the ICC was understood primarily as a 
Western instrument from the moment the UNSC made use of its powers – underlining this 
paper’s argument that the UNSC is key in understanding the postcolonial critique. Looking at 
the AU’s decision not to cooperate with the ICC, shows that irrespectively of whether the 
postcolonial critique is true it has severe negative consequences for the ICC.  
V. Ways forward: Improving the Legitimacy and Acceptance of the ICC 
Regardless of whether the postcolonial critique is justified or not, it poses a serious 
legitimacy threat to the ICC. As this paper argues that through identifying the weaknesses of 
the ICC’s system, the postcolonial critique should be seen as a chance to improve these 
difficulties, the next paragraph explores ways of how the ICC’s legitimacy could be improved 
through drawings insights from the postcolonial critique. 
1. Strengthening African Regional Entities and the Complementarity 
Principle  
Essential to the legitimacy of the ICC is that it succeeds in dispelling the feeling that it 
is a foreign body to Africans.150 In the end, it does not matter whether this feeling is justified 
or not, but as long as the ICC is depicted as a foreign body, its legitimacy is questioned. Also, 
the critique on the ICC is vulnerable for acting as a pretext for political purposes. This means 
that the question of whether the postcolonial critique is true is less essential than how to react 
to it.  
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A strong symbolic gesture would be to conduct trials on African soil and as close as 
possible to the crime scenes and the location of the victims.151 Vital for the acceptance of the 
ICC is the inclusion of African Regional entities like the Economic Community of West 
African States and the Southern African Development Community. A way should be found to 
allow these institutions to play a role in linking the political and judicial agenda in Africa.152  
For the acceptance of the ICC it is essential that the complementarity principle 
entrenched in Article 17 of the RS is taken seriously. The underlying logic of that principle is 
that the ICC must supplement the work of national jurisdictions. It can only exercise 
jurisdiction when states prove to be inactive and/or unwilling or unable to prosecute.153 From 
a concerned African government perspective, an enhanced capacity to claim their first right to 
prosecute the international crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC might be a tool to make 
sure their claim to sovereignty is respected.154 Thus, instead of weakening states and 
undermining sovereignty, properly understood the ICC regime does the opposite: it «[…] 
strengthens the hand of domestic parties seeking such trials, allowing them to wrap 
themselves in a nationalist mantle».155 
As the complementarity principle effectively creates a presumption in favour of action 
at the level of states,156 it might also create an incentive for them to develop their national 
prosecution mechanisms.157 This developmental concept according to which the ICC should 
aim to catalyse and support domestic investigations and prosecutions is referred to as ‘positive 
complementarity’.158 
As the ICC will only exercise jurisdiction where states having jurisdiction are unwilling 
or unable genuinely to carry out the prosecution, the fact that Bashir has been indicted by the 
ICC is, therefore, an indication that, in the view of the OTP, African states having jurisdiction 
over the crimes are unable or unwilling genuinely to try Bashir.159 The effect of the argument 
that trials for the atrocities committed should be tried by Africans, therefore, would be to 
defeat the object of the RS, namely to end impunity for grave international crimes.160 
2. Regional African Criminal Court 
As the ICC is a court of last resort, a regional African Criminal Court would make 
sense, especially as this could foster the legitimacy of the ICC.161  
The African Court of Justice (ACJ) was envisioned in the constitutive act to be the 
principal judicial organ of the AU. The Protocol establishing the ACJ was adopted in 2003, 
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and eighteen African states subsequently ratified it, with the effect of bringing the Protocol 
info force.162 
The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) was established in 2004 
and became operational in 2008.163 As the ACHPR’s effectiveness was being questioned, the 
proposal was made to merge the ACJ and the ACHPR.164 This would create the new African 
Court of Justice on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACJHR) which will take responsibility for 
crimes committed on the African continent.165 
While the Protocol establishing the ACJHR was adopted in July 2008 at the 11th AU 
Summit, it has never come into force. It requires fifteen ratifications to enter into force166 but 
has only been ratified by six states so far.167  
Although the focus of the ACJHR originally was on human rights,168 the ASP requested 
a study into the implications of extending the court’s jurisdiction to criminal matters in 
2009.169 In June 2014, the AU adopted the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the 
Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (‘Malabo Protocol’),170 even though 
the protocol establishing the ACJHR had not come into force yet.  
The Malabo Protocol extends the jurisdiction of the proposed ACJHR to include 
international and transnational crimes, including those covered in the RS.171 The logic and 
organisation of the ACJHR is to be complementary to national African courts, only having 
jurisdiction if African states are unwilling or unable to act.172 The relationship between the 
ACJHR and the ICC is unclear; ranging from the ICC having complementarity jurisdiction to 
the ICC acting as a court of appeal.173 Also, the role of the UNSC remains unclear.174 
The need identified by the AU to accelerate the integration of the contents of the RS at 
the regional level was a response to the postcolonial critique and the indictment of Sudanese 
President al-Bashir and the concerns about its potentially destabilizing effects on the 
continent.175  
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The ACJHR also presents difficulties: First, complaints are only possible against states 
and not against individuals. Second, the ACJHR only allows direct access to member states 
and a limited number of African NGOs.176 Third, the Malabo Protocol has been heavily 
criticised for its Art. 46Abis which deals with immunities and states that no charges shall be 
commenced or continued before the court against any serving AU head of state or 
government, during their tenure of office. This inclusion frames the argument that the ACJHR 
is merely an attempt to perpetuate a culture of impunity for criminal leaders177 and is 
vulnerable to domestic political pressures.178 Fourth, the funding of the court remains 
uncertain.179  
In respect to the ACJHR, a concept of regional complementarity would be compelling 
as this would support the acceptance of the ICC180 as international criminal justice would not 
be synonymous with the ICC.181 In assessing the admissibility of a case before the ICC, it 
should also be considered whether any action has been taken not only in the national courts of 
the state but also at regional courts.182 The RS should be amended to include regional courts 
in its conception of complementarity, even though the Malabo Protocol excludes the ICC and 
international jurisdictions from its conception of complementarity.183 This would be the best 
way to foster the greatest sense of ‘local’ justice184 and enforce the primacy of state 
sovereignty.185  
VI. Conclusion 
The ICC is surely not a creation of Western powers. This is underlined by the history of 
the ICC’s creation and the serious engagement of African states in that history.186 The first 
aspect of the postcolonial critique, namely the accusation that the ICC is biased against Africa 
and Africans is insofar true as that the work of the ICC has focused on Africa and Africans so 
far.187  
However, where this is due to self-referrals by African states, this argument is not valid. 
In terms of the expressive role of the ICC, the fact that only Africans have been tried, whether 
justified or not, has an impact on the global perception where most crimes are committed.  
The second aspect, namely that the ICC is a hegemonic tool of the West, highlights the 
role of politics regarding the ICC. The ICC is not a purely legal institution and has to navigate 
international jurisprudence, realpolitik, and cultural nuances.188 Rather than denying its 
politics, the ICC should recognize and explain its politics and choices. Thereby, it 
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acknowledges that, with its financial and jurisdictional limitations, the ICC can only be a 
symbolic court that only has the resources to prosecute a fraction of what occurs in a world, 
and engage in an open dialogue with victims and stakeholders on the choices it thus needs to 
make.189 Law must be understood as a special form of politics, through which prosecutorial 
priorities and selectivity are translated into judicial processes against those that are believed to 
be most needed to be held to account.190 Generally, it is too simple to portray the ICC as a 
hegemonic tool of the West, as African states played an important role in its creation. 
However, this critique has a point regarding the role of the UNSC and its Western political 
agendas pushed by the P5. How can it be that the UNSC can refer or defer cases to the ICC, 
while the majority of the P5 are not even a party to the RS? Hence, the only aspect where the 
postcolonial critique is clearly justified is the role of the UNSC. As for the rest of the 
postcolonial critique, I argue that the question of its correctness is less crucial than the 
question of how to respond to it. First of all, it is essential that the postcolonial critique is 
taken seriously191 as the rhetoric of condemnation practiced by many African states – 
portraying the ICC as an agent of neo-imperialism – in the worst case can damage the 
institution so much that it is simply abandoned altogether.192 The politicization of the ICC by 
the world’s most powerful nations in the UNSC poses a continuous threat to the legitimacy of 
the court. This politicization remains of particular concern given that in many ways the ICC 
must rely upon its legitimacy to garner the cooperation and compliance necessary to execute 
its mandate. Even if states do not formally withdraw, without the political will of cooperation 
in all state parties, the ICC cannot function effectively. The obligation to cooperate with the 
ICC is central to its success as the ICC does not have its own police force to arrest persons 
with an outstanding arrest warrant.193 The ICC also relies on the cooperation of the member 
states in evidence gathering against the suspect.194 Without effective state cooperation, it is 
almost impossible for the ICC to achieve its goal to provide justice for victims of crimes.195 
The challenge of the ICC consists in it being dependent on the cooperation of a government to 
fulfil its mandate, yet it is that same government that stands to be investigated.196 This need 
for cooperation means that regardless of whether the postcolonial critique is true or not, it 
should be fully engaged with in order to anticipate the critics and, if possible, to prevent the 
instrumentalization of this criticism.  
One also must reflect on the consequences if one were to agree fully with the 
postcolonial critique. What would be an alternative to the ICC? Africa’s judiciaries often have 
no capacity or political will to bring to justice violators of international humanitarian law, 
who in most cases are prominent state actors, including heads of state and government or their 
surrogates in the security forces. Warlords are equally powerful and the fact that they have the 
capacity to challenge the state through violence means it is difficult to put them to trial locally 
as well.197 Hence, as long as African state parties fail to fight impunity and to ensure that the 
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rights of the victims of atrocious crimes are protected, the ICC, despite its shortcomings, 
remains the most appropriate institution.198  
Addressing impunity requires the ICC and the AU to see each other as partners and not 
antagonists. This is in support of the argument advanced by Du Plessis that «[…][t]he 
fulfilment of the aims and objectives of the ICC on the African continent […] are dependent 
on the support of African states[…], the AU and […] civil society. Meeting these needs 
requires commitment to a collaborative relationship between these stakeholders and the 
ICC».199 
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